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THE WIAA AS A STATE ACTOR: A
DECADE LATER, BRENTWOOD
ACADEMY’S POTENTIAL EFFECT ON
WISCONSIN INTERSCHOLASTIC
SPORTS
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost every rule, there is an exception. And, for every exception
made, there are countless others that are denied.
The Wisconsin
Interscholastic Athletic Association’s (WIAA) bylaws exemplify this axiom.
If an athlete believes he should be exempt from a rule, he is able to apply for a
waiver. Through the tedious waiver process, it is inherent that not all athletes
will feel that they had their “day in court” or the chance to have their case
fairly heard. Some athletes will believe that they were slighted or wronged by
the WIAA’s denial of their waiver. This Comment will pose a hypothetical
situation where standout high school football player Mike Stasiewski feels so
wronged that he brings a claim against the WIAA for violating his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process. In all likelihood, the WIAA would assert
that it is not a state actor and, as such, that it has not infringed on Stasiewski’s
constitutional rights.
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association, the Supreme Court held that an interscholastic athletic association
comprised of both public and private schools could fall under the state action
doctrine. 1 In the years preceding that decision, courts nationwide found high
school athletic associations to be state actors and, thus, within the purview of
the U.S. Constitution. 2 One court that has not decided whether its state’s
interscholastic athletic association is a state actor is the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.

1. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 302 (2001).
2. See e.g., Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1987); Clark v.
Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983);
La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. St. Augustine High Sch., 396 F.2d 224, 227–228 (5th Cir. 1968);
Okla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269, 272–73 (10th Cir. 1963); Ind. High Sch.
Athletic Ass’n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Ind. 1997); Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n v.
Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768, 774–75 (Miss. 1994); Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 612
A.2d 734, 736 (R.I. 1992).
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The WIAA is the sole governing authority over high school athletics in
Wisconsin. 3 It is a voluntary, nonprofit organization that regulates both public
and nonpublic high schools and middle schools. 4 Despite the guidance set out
for state action in Brentwood Academy, in the ten years since, the issue has
never reached the Supreme Court of Wisconsin nor has it been specifically
ruled on in Wisconsin’s lower courts. Therefore, it is unknown if the WIAA is
a state actor. This Comment will demonstrate that, because of its pervasive
entwinement with the State, the WIAA should be considered a state actor.
Part II of this Comment will pose a hypothetical situation where Mike
Stasiewski, a high school football player from a fictitious high school in
Wisconsin, brings a due process claim against the WIAA after being
suspended. To provide the background for an analysis of Stasiewski’s claim,
Part III will provide an overview of the state action doctrine and the relevant
tests employed by the U.S. Supreme Court to find state action. This part will
culminate with an explanation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark
Brentwood Academy decision. Part IV will then provide an in-depth look at
the WIAA’s makeup and functions, look at the scattered relevant Wisconsin
case law, and finally will analyze whether Stasiewski has a viable
constitutional claim by virtue of the WIAA potentially qualifying as a state
actor.
II. MIKE STASIEWSKI’S CLAIM
Mike Stasiewski was a standout quarterback ready to begin his senior year
at Lambeau West High School. Stasiewski’s parents divorced over the
summer, and, despite his adamant objections, Stasiewski was forced to live
with his mother and continue attending Lambeau West, the closest public
school to her home. After leading the team to a WIAA Division I state title his
junior year, Stasiewski was named the preseason First-Team All-State
quarterback for his senior season.
During the first week of practice, Stasiewski was notably detached. As a
result of his living situation, he had problems concentrating and would lose his
composure at practice. After a tumultuous week, Stasiewski could not handle
the stress of living with his mother, so he packed up and moved in with his
father on the other side of town. Because his father lived in a different district,
Stasiewski had to transfer to Lambeau East before the school year began, and,
upon arrival at Lambeau East, he sought to play football. When he met with

3. About the WIAA, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi.org/index.php? id=
500 (last visited Feb. 17, 2011).
4. Id.
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the athletic director at Lambeau East, he was informed that he was ineligible
per WIAA transfer rules.
A. WIAA Bylaws
Unfortunately for Stasiewski, the WIAA Rules of Eligibility provide a
significant obstacle in obtaining eligibility to play football at Lambeau East.
With regard to a student residence and transfer, the Rules of Eligibility state,
in pertinent part:
A. A full time student, whether an adult or not, is eligible for
varsity interscholastic competition only at the school within
whose attendance boundaries his/her parents reside, within a
given school district, with these additional provisions . . .
3) In the event of a divorce or legal separation, whether
pending or final, a student’s residence at the beginning of the
school year shall determine eligibility except in situations
involving transfer after the fourth consecutive semester
following entry into Grade 9. For the purpose of this rule,
attendance at one day of school and/or attendance at one
athletic practice shall determine ‘beginning of school year.’
Under this rule, a student who transfers after the beginning of
the school year shall be ineligible at the new school unless
approval is granted by the Board of Control in accordance
with the transfer and/or waiver provisions . . . . 5
Any student who transfers after his fourth consecutive semester is
ineligible to practice or compete for one calendar year unless the transfer was
“made necessary by a total change in residence by parent(s).” 6 Furthermore,
in cases of divorced parents, a student who has established eligibility with one
parent is ineligible to play sports if the student moves to live with the other
parent and attends a different school. 7 Because Stasiewski practiced for a full
week at Lambeau West, he established eligibility there. As such, he is
ineligible to play at Lambeau East. The only way for Stasiewski to challenge
his ineligibility is to apply for a waiver.

5. WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N RULES OF ELIGIBILITY, art. II, § 1(A)(3) (2011)
(emphasis added).
6. Id. § 3(A)(1).
7. Article II Residence and Transfer, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi.
org/index.php?id=545 (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
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B. Mike Stasiewski’s Challenge
The WIAA bylaws provide a small exception for a waiver of the transfer
requirement if the school requests it in advance, on behalf of a student, and
with a presentation of clear documentation showing extenuating
circumstances. 8 Stasiewski pled his case to the Lambeau School Board and
the WIAA’s executive staff, but was summarily denied at each level without
much consideration. Because it was his senior year and losing a year of
eligibility could potentially cost him a college scholarship, Stasiewski
immediately filed for a preliminary injunction against enforcing the transfer
rule as well as a federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His claim
under § 1983 was that the WIAA did not give him an adequate opportunity to
defend his waiver request, resulting in a violation of his constitutionally
guaranteed right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, because § 1983 is a fee-shifting statute, which forces the losing
party to pay the attorney’s fees of the prevailing party, if Stasiewski’s claim
carries the day, the WIAA will be responsible for paying the reasonable
attorney’s fees that he incurred as a result of the suit. 9
The trial court held in favor of the WIAA on the grounds that the WIAA is
not a state actor and, thus, cannot infringe on Stasiewski’s due process rights.
The court of appeals affirmed, and the issue of whether the WIAA is a state
actor is now before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. If Stasiewski’s appeal and
subsequent claim are successful, the WIAA will be enjoined from enforcing
the transfer rule and will have to grant his waiver to play football at Lambeau
East his senior year.
III. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES TO
BRENTWOOD ACADEMY
Before Stasiewski’s case can be heard on the merits, a threshold analysis
is required. A Fourteenth Amendment due process claim requires that
Stasiewski establish that the adverse party is a state actor. 10 Because the most
important issue before the Wisconsin Supreme Court is whether the WIAA is

8. WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N RULES OF ELIGIBILITY, art. II, § 5(A)(2) (2011).
“Such documentation must include communications from (a) parents, (b) person(s) with whom
student is living within requesting school’s attendance boundaries and (c) school officials within
whose attendance boundaries parents reside.” Id.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2011).
10. See Diane Heckman, Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Governing
Interscholastic Athletics, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 3 (2005). The other three elements a claimant
must establish in a due process claim are: (1) the plaintiff is a person; (2) he has a life, liberty, or
property interest involved; and (3) the adverse party denied him procedural due process. Id.
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a state actor, this Comment will be restricted to that analysis.
Any direct or indirect action by a government entity, public school, state
university, state college, or any of its officials is always considered state action
for the purposes of the U.S. Constitution because those entities act on behalf of
the government. 11 However, issues can arise when the purported state actor is
not a part of one of these public entities because there is not a bright-line, allencompassing test for finding state action. 12 The requirement that the adverse
party be engaged in state action recognizes that the majority of the rights
secured by the Constitution are protected from government infringement. 13
The doctrine preserves individual citizens’ autonomy by providing that private
citizens can act freely without being subject to the constraints of the
Constitution. 14
Throughout the U.S. Supreme Court’s history, the state action doctrine has
undergone relatively dramatic changes. One of the first instances where the
Court was presented with the issue of state action was in The Civil Rights
Cases, a consolidation of five cases in which the Court determined that
discrimination by private individuals against African-Americans was
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 Writing for the majority,
Justice Bradley opined, “[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the amendment.” 16 Although this decision is recognized as
the first broad test for finding state action, 17 the following sections will
discuss two of the main state action tests discussed in the Brentwood Academy
case: the public function test and the sufficient nexus analysis. These tests are
integral to the progeny of state action cases in the sports context because they
served as the backbone for the Supreme Court’s entwinement test articulated
in Brentwood Academy.
A. The Public Function Test
The Court famously revisited the doctrine of state action in Marsh v.

11. GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 164–69, 196–97 (3d ed. 2002); Julie K.
Brown, Note, Less is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. REV. 561, 564 (2008).
12. WONG, supra note 11, at 164–69, 196–97; Brown, supra note 11, at 564.
13. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 156 (1978)).
14. Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action Doctrine’s Application to Amateur
Sports, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183, 185 (2008).
15. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–12 (1883).
16. Id. at 11.
17. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721–22 (1961).
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Alabama. 18 In Marsh, the Court was asked to decide whether a state could
convict a Jehovah’s Witness for criminal trespass for distributing religious
literature within the confines of a company-owned town. 19 The town had the
same characteristics of any American town, except it was owned by the Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation. 20 The plaintiff asserted that her conviction was in
violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and claimed that the
privately held town was a state actor. 21 The Court agreed and, in doing so, set
out the parameters for the public function test for finding state action. 22 The
Court held that mere ownership does not constitute absolute and uninhibited
dominion. 23 Rather, the more an owner opens up his property for use by the
general public, the more his rights become limited by the constitutional rights
of those who use the property. 24 Because the town was built and operated to
benefit the public, its operation was deemed a public function.25 Thus, despite
its private ownership, the town itself was a state actor and had to operate under
the constraints of the Constitution. 26
B. The Sufficient Nexus Analysis
The next step in the evolution of the state action doctrine was the “nexus
analysis,” which finds state action when the government has required or
significantly encouraged the specific act that infringes on an individual’s
constitutional rights. 27 The U.S. Supreme Court employed this analysis in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority. 28 In Burton, an African-American
man was refused service at a coffee shop based solely on his race. 29 The
question of state action arose because the coffee shop was located in a parking

18. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504 (1946).
19. Id. at 502.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 504.
22. Id. at 506–07; Alan R. Madry, Statewide School Athletic Associations and Constitutional
Liability; Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 12 MARQ.
SPORTS. L. REV. 365, 377–78 (2002).
23. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 508–09.
26. Id.
27. Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Paula Alexander Becker, Is it Time to Revisit the Doctrine of “State
Action” in the Context of Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Sports?, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
191, 205 (2007).
28. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723–24; Madry, supra note 22, at 378.
29. Burton, 365 U.S. at 716.
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structure that was owned and operated by a Delaware state agency. 30 The
land was publicly owned, the facility obtained funding from the city, and the
facility was operated by the State. 31 The Court held that the coffee shop, by
virtue of its “involvement” with the State, was considered a state actor and had
thus violated Burton’s Fourteenth Amendment protections. 32 It opined that,
“private conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal
Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its
manifestations has been found to have become involved in it.” 33 When a state
becomes sufficiently involved in a private project, the private entity has
putatively become a state actor and can be held liable under constitutional
standards through the nexus analysis. 34
C. State Action and Amateur Athletics Collide Before the Supreme Court
The 1970s–1980s were times of great change for the U.S. Supreme Court
in both its composition and its approach to the state action doctrine. 35
Between 1969 and 1972, three new Justices—Warren, Powell, and
Rehnquist—were appointed. 36 During this period, Justice Rehnquist wrote
five decisions applying the doctrine, notably strengthening the threshold for
finding state action and making it more difficult for a plaintiff to show state
action. 37 This series of decisions arguably molded the state action test into its
present form. 38 However, until 1973, the issue of state action in amateur
athletics had never reached the Court under any of the previously articulated
state action tests.
In 1973, Jerry “The Shark” Tarkanian took over as head coach of the
basketball team at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas (UNLV), a team that
had previously been perennially mediocre at best. 39 Within four years,
Tarkanian had transformed UNLV into a powerhouse, going 29–3 and
finishing third in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
tournament in 1977. 40 Nevertheless, the sudden turnaround precipitated a
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 716–19.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 722.
Madry, supra note 22, at 378.
Koller, supra note 14, at 186.
Madry, supra note 22, at 382.
Id.
Id.
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 180 (1988).
Throwing in the Towel: Fresno State’s Tarkanian Retires after 38 Years in Coaching, SI.COM
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NCAA investigation of the basketball program, where the NCAA found thirtyeight violations of NCAA rules by UNLV, including ten committed by
Tarkanian himself. 41 The NCAA put UNLV on probation for two years and
ordered UNLV to sever all ties with Tarkanian during the probationary
period. 42 Tarkanian brought suit against UNLV and the NCAA, alleging that
he had been deprived of his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment and that the NCAA had engaged in state action when it
recommended his suspension. 43
Although in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian the
U.S. Supreme Court found that UNLV, as a state university, was
unquestionably a state actor, it refused to hold that the NCAA also qualified as
a state actor. 44 Because the NCAA used no governmental powers in its
investigation, as well as the fact that it gave UNLV options other than
suspension, the Court found that the NCAA could not be a state actor. 45 The
Tarkanian Court noted that its finding applied to the NCAA but gave little
guidance as to the application at the interscholastic level beyond an abstract
footnote simply stating, “[t]he situation would, of course, be different if the
membership consisted entirely of institutions located within the same State,
many of them public institutions created by the same sovereign.” 46 The issue
of high school athletic associations as state actors did not reach the nation’s
highest court until 2001 in Brentwood Academy. 47 It was in Brentwood
Academy that the U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the entwinement test for
finding state action; the factors discussed therein would be applicable for a
Wisconsin court examining the WIAA.
D. The Entwinement of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association
Brentwood Academy is a private Christian school in Tennessee and a
perennial powerhouse in high school football. 48 It has been nationally ranked
by USA Today and has won numerous Tennessee Secondary School Athletic

(Mar. 15, 2002), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/college/news/2002/03/15/tarkanian_
retires_ap/; 1977 NCAA Basketball Tournament Bracket, DATABASESPORTS.COM, http:// www.
databasesports.com/ncaab/tourney.htm?yr=1977 (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
41. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 180–81.z
42. Id. at 181.
43. Id. at 181–82.
44. See id. at 192–99.
45. Id. at 197–99.
46. Id. at 193 n.13.
47. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291.
48. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 760 (6th Cir. 1999).
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Association (TSSAA) state championships. 49 The TSSAA is a voluntary high
school athletic association. At the time of the lawsuit, the TSSAA was
comprised of 290 public schools and 55 private schools. 50 Public schools
made up eighty-four percent of the TSSAA’s voting population. 51 Its power
resided in the Board of Control, which consisted of nine elected members
representing different regions of Tennessee. 52 All of the board members were
principals or superintendents of member schools serving in ex officio roles. 53
At all times relevant to the suit, the board members were exclusively from
public schools, although private school administrators were technically
eligible for election to the board as well. 54 The TSSAA’s staff members were
not paid by the State, but they were still eligible for the State’s public
retirement system for school employees. 55 The majority of the board
meetings were held during official school hours. 56 TSSAA received no state
funding—revenues were derived primarily from ticket sales and, in small part,
from dues paid by member schools. 57 As for the actual competitions, the
schools scheduled all athletic events, with the exception of the state
tournaments. 58 When the TSSAA used public facilities for events, it entered
into contracts with the State and paid for their use. 59
In 1997, several rival football coaches alleged that Brentwood Academy
violated the TSSAA rules for a number of reasons. 60 The TSSAA promptly
investigated the allegations and found three specific violations. The two
violations that were analyzed by the Sixth Circuit pertained to the recruiting
rule. 61 At the time of the suit, the TSSAA’s bylaws included a recruiting rule
that provided:
The use of undue influence on a student (with or without an
athletic record), his or her parents or guardians of a student by
any person connected, or not connected, with the school to
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 762.
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291.
Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 762.
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 300.
Id.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 290–91.
Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 762.
Id.
Id. at 760–61.
Id. at 760.
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secure or retain a student for athletic purposes shall be a
violation of the recruiting rule. 62
The first violation occurred when Brentwood’s football coach gave free
football game tickets to a middle school coach and two of his players. 63 The
second violation involved a letter sent to all incoming ninth-graders committed
to Brentwood, which invited them to join the team for spring practice. 64
As a result of the TSSAA’s finding that Brentwood violated the recruiting
rule, Brentwood was ineligible to qualify for TSSAA tournaments in football
and basketball for one year and was also given two years probation. 65
Brentwood appealed, but after the process ran its course, the penalties were
increased. 66 Brentwood was banned from tournaments for 2 years, placed on
probation for 4 years, and fined $3000. 67 Brentwood sued the TSSAA,
praying for an injunction against enforcement of the recruiting rule, and filed a
federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The § 1983 claim alleged that
Brentwood had been deprived of its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 68
The district court granted Brentwood’s summary judgment motion on its First
Amendment claim and enjoined the TSSAA’s enforcement of the recruiting
rule. 69 The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, vacated the injunction, and remanded for proceedings consistent
with its opinion. 70 The court analyzed the TSSAA’s involvement with the
State and applied the public function test as well as a variation of the nexus
analysis. 71 In regard to both, the court held that Brentwood failed to establish
that the TSSAA’s actions were fairly attributed to the State. 72
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Sixth Circuit,
holding that the TSSAA was a state actor by way of the newly articulated
“entwinement test.” 73 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, began by
noting that “no one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board
62. Id. at 761.
63. Id. at 760.
64. Id. at 760–61.
65. Id. at 761.
66. Id. There is no articulated reason in either of the Brentwood Academy decisions for why the
penalties were increased.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 766.
71. Id. at 763–64.
72. Id. at 766.
73. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 304.
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for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient,
for there may be some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the
government.” 74
The Court found that the TSSAA’s private nature was greatly outweighed
by the pervasive entwinement of its member public schools and officials. 75
The public school ex officio staff could only be reasonably viewed as actors
representing their institutions within the scope of their public school duties. 76
The TSSAA provided the mechanism for producing rules for its members, and
regulating eighty-four percent of which were Tennessee’s public school
athletic teams. 77 The Court found entwinement from the bottom up between
the public school officials and the TSSAA. 78
The Court opined further that the State had provided entwinement from
the top down by assigning ex officio members to control the TSSAA’s
legislative arm and by providing all officials with eligibility for the State’s
retirement system. 79 The Court reasoned that the entwined relationship was
further evidenced by the TSSAA’s enforcement of the same preamendment
regulations that were reviewed and approved by the State Board. 80 The
TSSAA argued that under the public function test, it could not be viewed as a
state actor. 81 However, the Court disagreed, stating, “[w]hen, therefore, the
relevant facts show pervasive entwinement to the point of largely overlapping
identity, the implication of state action is not affected by pointing out that the
facts might not loom large under a different test.” 82
The Brentwood Academy holding was a landmark decision because it was
the first time the Supreme Court found that a high school athletic association
was a state actor. However, the Supreme Court did not hold that all athletic
associations are state actors. It merely held that the TSSAA is a state actor. 83
Thus, the importance of Brentwood Academy is not its holding, but rather the
test it employed to get to that holding. 84 In deciding whether the WIAA is a
state actor for the purposes of Mike Stasiewski’s claim, a careful analysis of

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 295–96.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 299–300.
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 302–03.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 302.
Id.
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the entwinement test, as set out in Brentwood Academy, will likely be
determinative for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
IV. IS MIKE STASIEWSKI’S CLAIM AGAINST THE WIAA VIABLE?
The WIAA is the first organized high school athletic association in the
country, with its roots dating back to 1895. 85 The WIAA is a self-proclaimed
voluntary, nonprofit organization made up of public and private high schools
and middle schools throughout Wisconsin. 86 In 2000, the WIAA became the
state’s sole governing body over high school athletics when the Wisconsin
Independent School Athletic Association, the governing authority over private
high schools, disbanded and its private member schools joined the WIAA. 87
A. How the WIAA Works
The WIAA is presently comprised of 506 schools, about 70 of which are
private. 88 Member schools govern the WIAA, and its rules and policies are
developed by its membership through vote or by membership-elected
committees. 89 Several advisory committees exist and are comprised of
coaches, athletic directors, and school administrators. 90
All WIAA
committees meet during school days and during school hours. 91 Three of
those committees, the Board of Control, the Advisory Council, and the Sports
Advisory Committee are made up of elected high school administrators, and
each has only one requisite representative from a non-public school. 92 The
other committees—the Sportsmanship Committee, the Ad hoc Committees,
the Officials Advisory, the Coaches Advisory, and the Medical Advisory—are
85. History of the WIAA, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.wiaawi.org/
index.php?id=458 (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
86. About the WIAA, supra note 3.
87. A Decade of Voluntary Membership for All Schools, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC
ASS’N, http://wiaawi.org/index.php?id=527 (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
88. WIAA Member Schools Directory, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.
wiaawi.org/index.php?id=364 (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
89. WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N CONST. art. IX.
90. WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N HANDBOOK 2011–12 - INTRODUCTION TO THE
WIAA 3, 5 [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO THE WIAA].
91. See Board of Control, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi.org/index.
php?id=158 (last visited Jan. 21, 2011); Advisory Council, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N,
http://wiaawi.org/index.php?id=159 (last visited Sept. 5, 2011); Sports Advisory Committee, WIS.
INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi.org/index.php?id=160 (last visited Sept. 5, 2011);
Coaches Advisory, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi.org/index.php?id=161
(last visited Sept. 5, 2011); Sportsmanship Committee, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N,
http://wiaawi.org/index.php?id=164 (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
92. INTRODUCTION TO THE WIAA, supra note 90, at 5, 7.
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all appointed positions. 93 All of these positions are unpaid. 94 The WIAA
retains liaisons to the Board of Control outside of these committees, 95 which
are necessary because the WIAA’s relationship with these organizations is so
close that it is important for them to be present to feed information back and
These liaisons are representatives from the
forth during meetings. 96
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, the Wisconsin Association of
School Boards, and the Wisconsin Athletic Directors Association. 97
The WIAA receives no state funding; therefore, the majority of its funding
comes from gate admissions at playoff games, officials’ fees, and dues from
its member schools. 98 Scheduling regular season competitions is the
responsibility of local school districts or individual conferences; however,
once the playoffs roll around, the WIAA does all the scheduling and facilitates
the games. 99
Each school is provided with the WIAA handbook and is expected to fully
understand the rules it sets out. 100 Compliance with the rules is the
responsibility of each individual school. 101 The WIAA’s executive staff is
informed when a rule is broken or when there is a question of whether a rule
applies in a given situation. 102
Rules are amended by a vote of the entire membership, but the Board of
Control makes the final decisions in determining the outcome of rule
changes. 103 A simple majority is required to amend a rule. 104 All of these
characteristics would need to be analyzed to determine if the WIAA is a state
actor for the purposes of Stasiewski’s claim. Although the issue has never
been addressed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, a few lower courts have
touched on state action and the WIAA in the past forty years.

93. Telephone Interview with Todd Clark, Director of Commc’n and Advanced Media, Wis.
Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n (Aug. 24, 2010) (recording on file with author).
94. Id.
95. INTRODUCTION TO THE WIAA, supra note 90, at 3, 5.
96. Interview with Todd Clark, supra note 93.
97. INTRODUCTION TO THE WIAA, supra note 90, at 3.
98. Interview with Todd Clark, supra note 93.
99. Id.
100. About the WIAA, supra note 3.
101. Id.
102. Interview with Todd Clark, supra note 93.
103. Board of Control, supra note 91; How are Rules Developed or Changed?, WIS.
INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.wiaawi.org/index.php?id=7 (last visited Sept. 5,
2011).
104. WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N CONST. art. IX, § 2(B).
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B. Case Law on State Action with Regard to the WIAA
Twenty years prior to Brentwood Academy, two Wisconsin district court
decisions addressed whether the WIAA could be considered a state actor
against constitutional claims. In Kelly v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic
Association, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
found that, because the plaintiffs failed to plead anything about state action in
their complaint, the WIAA could not be a state actor. 105 Four years later, in
Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association, the Eastern District
Court was called upon to determine whether co-educational athletics violated
equal protection under a § 1983 claim when a group of female students
brought a class action suit against the WIAA alleging that a WIAA rule was in
violation of Title IX. 106 The court found the WIAA was a state actor because
the WIAA exerted direct influence upon the school’s athletic programs. 107
However, these cases would likely be of little precedential value today
because they were decided more than thirty years ago, long before the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brentwood Academy. In the years since Kelly
and Leffel, the WIAA has undergone significant changes in its makeup, most
notably becoming the sole governing body for interscholastic sports in
Wisconsin. 108 Any state action case involving an interscholastic athletic
association would need to be analyzed in light of the Brentwood Academy
case, which was decided almost thirty years after Kelly and Leffel.
The first post-Brentwood Academy decision in Wisconsin was Bukowski v.
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association, an unpublished court of
appeals decision. 109 Bukowski is the only instance where a Wisconsin state
court was called on to determine whether the WIAA qualifies as a state
actor. 110 Bukowski, a male student at a public high school, sought an
injunction to enjoin the WIAA from enforcing a rule that disallowed him from
competing on the girls’ gymnastics team. 111 Bukowski alleged that the rule
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
Title IX. 112 The court gave short shrift to Bukowski’s argument that the
WIAA qualifies as a state actor because “Bukowski failed to produce any
105. Kelly v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 367 F. Supp. 1388, 1390 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
106. Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1119–21 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
107. Id. at 1119; see Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 398 F. Supp. 749, 750 (E.D.
Wis. 1975).
108. A Decade of Voluntary Membership for All Schools, supra note 87.
109. Bukowski v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 2007 WI App 1, ¶ 9.
110. Id.
111. Id. ¶ 1.
112. Id.
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evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, demonstrating that the WIAA is a state
actor.” 113 The only evidence Bukowski brought forward to establish state
action was an affidavit by the district superintendent stating that the high
school receives federal funding. 114 However, the mere receipt of federal
funds does not qualify the entity as a state actor. 115 Because Bukowski was
unable to proffer any legitimate evidence, the court found for the WIAA. 116
In a 2008-unpublished decision, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court held
the exact opposite, finding that the WIAA is a state actor in Wakefield v.
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association. 117 In Wakefield, a student
challenged the WIAA’s transfer rule that disallowed transfer students from
competing in athletics for one calendar year. 118 As a preliminary matter, to
determine whether the court could review the WIAA’s decisions, the court
examined whether the WIAA was a state actor and thus subject to judicial
review. 119 Citing Brentwood Academy as authority, the court found that the
WIAA is a state actor. 120 The court noted that its entwinement mirrors some
of the factors of Brentwood Academy. 121 For instance, every public senior
high school is a member, and there is no competing regulatory athletic
association in Wisconsin. 122 Both the WIAA and the TSSAA receive funding
through dues from members, which largely consist of public schools that are
funded from state tax dollars. 123 Furthermore, the court found that the
member schools have clearly delegated the power to regulate interscholastic
athletics to the WIAA because the students have no status with the WIAA,
whereas the schools do. 124 Finally, the court found it determinative that the
WIAA works closely with the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction by
having a liaison present at meetings. 125
Lastly, in June 2010, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin, in Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association v.
113. Id. ¶ 11.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. ¶ 17.
117. Wakefield v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, No. 08CV003423, at 7–9 (Milwaukee
Cty., Wis. Cir. Ct. 2008).
118. Id. at 3.
119. Id. at 5, 7.
120. Id. at 8–9.
121. Id. at 8.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Gannett Co., decided a case challenging the WIAA’s media policy. 126
Gannett claimed that the WIAA violated its First Amendment and equal
protection rights by giving a company the exclusive license to stream certain
tournament games. 127 Although the issue of whether the WIAA was a state
actor was not the main point of contention in the case, the WIAA went so far
as to stipulate that it was a state actor for the purposes of both claims. 128 In a
footnote, the district court stated, “[b]ecause the parties have stipulated that
WIAA is a ‘state actor’ for purposes of the First and Fourteenth Amendment,
that issue will not be addressed.” 129 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reiterated
that “[t]he parties have stipulated that WIAA is a state actor. This means that
its actions are constrained by the First Amendment. (We note that in other
cases where courts had to decide if similar organizations were state actors, the
answer has been yes . . . . )” 130 By its own stipulation, the WIAA conceded
that it is a state actor. Since Gannett, no reported decisions have addressed
state action and the WIAA.
C. What to Make of Wisconsin’s Scattered Case Law?
Because the issue of whether the WIAA qualifies as a state actor has never
reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Stasiewski’s attorney would be forced
to sort out the inconsistent decisions of the lower courts when analyzing
Stasiewski’s claim. In five decisions, courts found that the WIAA was a state
actor three times—once by way of stipulation—and found the opposite twice.
Three of these decisions were in federal court and would not be binding, while
the two state court decisions were unpublished and, by statute, 131 carry no
precedential value. Two of these cases were decided before the WIAA even
accepted private schools into its membership. Other than Bukowski and
Wakefield, no Wisconsin court, even outside of the sport context, has analyzed
the state action doctrine under Brentwood Academy’s entwinement test. 132 On
their face, the cases that do analyze state action would seem to be of little
guidance. However, a closer look reveals a potential explanation for the

126. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 716 F. Supp. 2d 773, 783–84 (W.D. Wis.
2010).
127. Id. at 786, 796.
128. Id. at 785 n.6.
129. Id.
130. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., No. 10-2627, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
17684, *4–5 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2011) (citing Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 298; Crane v. Ind. High Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 975 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added).
131. See WIS. STAT. § 809.23 (2011).
132. See Bukowski, 2007 WI App 1, at ¶¶ 10–11; Wakefield, No. 08CV003423 at 9.

TREVINO (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

12/21/2011 2:08 PM

THE WIAA AS A STATE ACTOR

303

inconsistencies.
Judging by the written opinions, it is clear that in the cases where courts
found that the WIAA was not a state actor the threshold requirement of state
action was not discussed in the plaintiff’s briefs and arguments. For instance,
in Kelly, the plaintiffs failed to establish a case for state action in their
pleadings. 133 Similarly, in Bukowski, the only proffered evidence in support
of a finding of state action was an affidavit stating that the school received
federal funding, which alone does not trigger state action. 134 In order to bring
a successful due process claim, Stasiewski’s attorney will need to make a
much stronger case with regard to state action before arguing against the
transfer rule, akin to the plaintiff in Wakefield, and avoid the pitfalls
demonstrated by the advocates in Kelly and Bukowski. The following sections
will explain why, under the entwinement standard set forth in Brentwood
Academy, Stasiewski will be able to show that the WIAA is a state actor.
D. The WIAA as a State Actor
In analyzing the decisions in the WIAA cases and Brentwood Academy, it
is clear that courts apply an incredibly fact-based approach in determining
whether an athletic association is a state actor. 135 To that end, a fact-based
inquiry is likely how the Wisconsin Supreme Court would approach
Stasiewski’s due process claim. Because the WIAA, when viewed in the
aggregate, is sufficiently entwined with the State of Wisconsin, the court will
likely find that it is a state actor.
One of the factors that may be determinative for the court in deciding
whether the WIAA is a state actor is the WIAA’s make-up. The WIAA’s
committee members are almost exclusively public school employees. 136
These committees are ultimately responsible for making and amending the
bylaws of the entire WIAA. 137 The Board of Control and the Advisory
Council are comprised of twenty-eight administrators from high schools
around the state and one liaison from the Wisconsin Association of School

133. Kelly, 367 F. Supp. at 1390.
134. Bukowski, 2007 WI App 1, at ¶ 11.
135. See generally Brentwood, 531 U.S. 288; Bukowski, 2007 WI App 1; Leffel, 444 F. Supp.
1117; Kelly, 367 F. Supp. 1388; Gannett Co., 716 F. Supp. 2d 773; Wakefield, No. 08CV003423.
136. See generally Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory Council, supra note 91; Sports
Advisory Committee, supra note 91; Coaches Advisory, supra note 91; Sportsmanship Committee,
supra note 91.
137. Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory Council, supra note 91; Sports Advisory
Committee, supra note 91; Coaches Advisory, supra note 91; Sportsmanship Committee, supra note
91.
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Boards. 138 Twenty-six of the twenty-eight voting high school administrators
on these two committees are public employees. 139 The public school
administrators, who are paid by the State of Wisconsin, are the individuals
making the decisions and making the rules for the organization that serves as
the sole governing body over athletics in Wisconsin. 140
The TSSAA’s Board of Control in Brentwood Academy mirrors the makeup of the WIAA. In both organizations, the power chiefly resides with public
school officials. 141 In Brentwood Academy, this exact make-up is what was
determinative in the U.S. Supreme Court’s finding that the TSSAA was so
entwined with the State so as to qualify it as a state actor. 142 The WIAA may
counter this assertion by noting that these committee members provide
services for the WIAA only in their capacity as committee members.
However, as public officials acting as representatives from their respective
districts and schools, it is difficult to imagine that they are able to completely
“step out” of their roles as administrators when voting on behalf of their
schools and constituency.
The entwinement between the WIAA and the State is further evidenced by
representatives from state organizations, such as the Department of Public
Instruction and the Wisconsin Association of School Boards, which serve as
liaisons to the Board of Control. 143 These liaisons are necessary to the
WIAA’s functionality because the relationships are so close that they need to
constantly feed information back and forth. 144 The liaison for the Wisconsin
Association of School Boards even has a voting member on the Board of
Control. 145 The entwinement between the WIAA’s decision-makers and the
State is arguably stronger than that found in Brentwood Academy because of
the close relationship with the liaisons. Furthermore, in Gannett, the WIAA
went so far as to stipulate that it was a state actor. 146 Any analysis of this
stipulation would be pure conjecture, but the fact remains that an organization
cannot simply pick and choose to be a state actor when it is convenient for it.
138. Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory Council, supra note 91.
139. Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory Council, supra note 91.
140. A Decade of Voluntary Membership for All Schools, supra note 87.
141. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 292–93; See generally Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory
Council, supra note 91; Sports Advisory Committee, supra note 91; Coaches Advisory, supra note 91;
Sportsmanship Committee, supra note 91.
142. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 300.
143. INTRODUCTION TO THE WIAA, supra note 90, at 3.
144. Interview with Todd Clark, supra note 93.
145. Board of Control, supra note 91.
146. Gannett Co., 716 F. Supp. 2d at 785 n.6; Gannett Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17684 at *4–
5.
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Although state funding alone does not amount to state action, 147 it
certainly can be a factor. 148 The WIAA’s membership is comprised of more
than 500 schools, and, of those, about 420 are public schools. 149 Although it
receives no direct funding from the state, nearly all of the WIAA’s funding
comes from membership fees and gate receipts from playoff competitions. 150
Almost eighty-five percent of its membership dues are paid by public schools,
which, in turn, receive their own funding from federal, state, and local
governments. 151 The playoff gate receipts are for competitions held almost
exclusively at public schools, 152 which are maintained by public employees.
For example, the state championships for all divisions in basketball, football,
tennis, swimming and diving, golf, and softball are held at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, while the track and field championships are held at the
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse. 153 Furthermore, each and every WIAA
meeting is held during the school day. 154 Because a vast majority of the
committee members attending these meetings are public school administrators
and teachers, the committee members are attending the meetings as a part of
their work day. As such, the State is essentially paying the WIAA committee
members to attend.
These factors all boil down to one conclusion: the WIAA is so entwined
with the State that it can be considered a state actor. Stasiewski’s attorney
would be wise to draw parallels between the WIAA and the TSSAA to
illustrate just how pervasive the State’s role is in governing the WIAA. By
pointing out that, in both cases, the associations are primarily comprised of
public schools, the people responsible for creating and amending the rules are
public employees, the association’s meetings are held during school hours, and
the associations are funded from revenue garnered at public schools for state
playoffs and in part by public school dues, Stasiewski will be able to show
state action and succeed where the plaintiffs in Bukowski and Kelly did not.

147. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Court found that a private high school that received ninety to
ninety-nine percent of its budget from state and federal funds was not a state actor. 457 U.S. 830,
832, 840 (1982).
148. See generally Brentwood, 531 U.S. 288.
149. WIAA Member Schools Directory, supra note 88.
150. Interview with Todd Clark, supra note 93.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. WIAA State Tournament Dates, WIS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://wiaawi.
org/?id=99 (last visited Feb. 25. 2011).
154. Board of Control, supra note 91; Advisory Council, supra note 91; Sports Advisory
Committee, supra note 91; Coaches Advisory, supra note 91; Sportsmanship Committee, supra note
91.
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Because the Wisconsin Supreme Court will likely find that the WIAA is a
state actor, Stasiewski’s claim that the WIAA violated his procedural due
process rights by denying his waiver to the transfer rule will go forward on its
merits. In Brentwood Academy, once the U.S. Supreme Court found the
TSSAA to be a state actor, the recruiting rule at issue was subject to judicial
review, and eventually the matter made its way back to the Supreme Court. 155
Similarly, because Stasiewski can show that the WIAA engages in state action,
the transfer rule at issue could be legally challenged and potentially struck
down.
The implications of the WIAA finally being ruled a state actor could be
far-reaching, as it opens up the WIAA to constitutional claims. Civil rights
claims under § 1983 could be attached to these actions, and, if successful, the
WIAA would be responsible for paying the plaintiff’s reasonable attorney
fees. Disgruntled athletes who feel their rights have been violated by the
WIAA Rules of Eligibility or Bylaws would have grounds to bring claims
under a myriad of constitutional claims such as equal protection, due process,
and free speech. Eventually, a case such as Stasiewski’s will reach the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and, once the WIAA is found to be a state actor,
it will no longer enjoy immunity from constitutional claims.
V. CONCLUSION
Because of the competitive nature inherent in interscholastic sports,
eligibility rules are constantly challenged. And for every challenge, there is an
unhappy party on the losing side. Stasiewski’s claim that the WIAA violated
his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment is not a hypothetical
lawsuit that could never occur. Whether the claim involves due process, free
speech, or any other violation of an athlete’s constitutional rights, it is only a
matter of time before a case along these lines makes it before the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin. When it does, it will be heard on its merits because the
court will likely find that the WIAA is a state actor. Based on the
administrative capacity of public school officials in the WIAA, its function as
the sole arm for interscholastic sports, its close relationship with the
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, its indirect receipt of state funds,

155. See generally Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 551 U.S. 291
(2007). Other courts that have found an athletic association to be a state actor have also allowed rule
challenges to proceed on the merits. See e.g., Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d
222 (Ind. 1997).
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and its revenue derived from use of public facilities, the WIAA is inextricably
entwined with the State of Wisconsin and qualifies as a state actor.
Joseph P. Trevino

